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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 20030625-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, 
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to grant a Motion To Suppress. 
Factually, at the time of the police encounter, officers had no reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Young had outstanding warrants to conduct a warrants search, detaining him for that 
period. Officers were going door to door looking for another individual, Albert Phillips. 
Upon contact with Mr. Young, officers allegedly grabbed him at the doorway and asked 
him to step outside for questioning. With their photo of Mr. Phillips in hand, they 
immediately realized that Mr. Young was not the man they were looking. 
Thereafter, the officers discovered an outstanding warrant and paced him 
into custody. Because he had just awoke, Officer Bruno entered into Mr. Young's home 
and retrieved a jacket and shoes. Later, officers allegedly discovered methamphetamine 
in the jacket after he was searched by a deputy at the jail. The search incident to arrest 
failed to produce any contraband. But during the ride over to the jail, Officer Bieber 
warned Mr. Young to confess possessing drugs now or if discovered at the jail he would 
face "smuggling contraband into a jail" charge. The threats appeared to be clairvoyance, 
because Officer Bieber's search of Mr. Young was unremarkable. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3 (1953, 
as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). John Young appeals the final 
order and judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County 
involving the denial of his motion to suppress. (R. at 68-69). Final judgment was 
entered on July 14, 2003. (R. at 94-97) (Attachment "A"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, 
Whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress? 
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
The standard of review in this matter has long since been established and 
was reiterated by this Court: 
'"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law which we [also] review for 
correctness."' 
In re B.V.. 33 P.3d 1083 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); see also State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
Utah State Const. Art. I, § 12. Utah State Const. Art. I, § 8. 
Utah State Const. Art. I, § 7. Utah State Const. Art. I, § 24. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 reh. den. 
404 U.S. 874, 92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971). 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527,(1983) 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). 
South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). 
State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
State v. South. 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). 
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
752(1972). 
Wattenburgv. U.S.. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE, 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from the arbitrary and unreasonable detention of Mr. 
Young on a May afternoon day just to run a warrants check on him while they attempted 
to locate a Mr. Albert Phillips who was wanted for questioning in connection to a police 
investigation. The officers possessed photo. Mr. Young was not that man. When 
dispatch completed its warrants check, the officers discovered that Mr. Young had an 
outstanding warrant. He was immediately placed into custody barefoot. 
Officers then entered into Mr. Young's home and retrieved shoes and a 
jacket for Mr. Young because he had just awakened because he works at night. A search 
of Mr. Young's person was conducted incident to arrest. While en route, Officer Bieber 
repeatedly asked Mr. Young if he had contraband on his person. Mr. Young denied 
possessing any drugs. While at the jail, another search by Deputy Englund, which 
produced a container of methamphetamine. These discoveries were the fruits of the 
poisonous tree and should have been suppressed by Judge Fuchs. 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
On May 9, 2002, this criminal action commenced against Mr. Young and a 
warrant for Mr. Young's arrest was issued. (R. at 1-6). On July 16, 2002, Mr. Young 
appeared with counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, where he was informed of the charges. (R. at 
25). On July 22, 2002, Mr. Oliver requested discovery. (R. at 26-31). The State of Utah 
responded to the discovery request on August 1, 2002, which included police reports. 
On September 3, 2002, the defendant waived the preliminary hearing. (R. at 39). 
Subsequently, Defendant was arraigned on September 16, 2002. (R. at 40). Based upon 
the police reports, the defendant filed a motion to suppress and supporting memorandum 
on November 7, 2002. (R. at 45-57). (Attachment "B"). The State responded to the 
motion to suppress on November 26, 2002. (R. at 58-67). (Attachment "C"). The trial 
court conducted its hearing on the motion to suppress and denied the same on December 
6, 2002. (R. at 68-69). (Attachment "D"). (See Transcript (R. at 104); Attachment "E"). 
Thereafter, a bench trial was conducted on June 6, 2003, where Judge Fuchs surprisingly 
convicted the defendant of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
(R. at 79-80).l Mr. Young was sentenced and committed on July 14, 2003. (R. at 94-
1
 The conviction surprised counsel, because the judge barely denied the motion to 
suppress. (T. at 62-65). Constitutional violations are what invokes the Exclusionary Rule. 
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97). (Attachment "A"). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial court denied Mr. Young's motion to suppress on December 6, 
2002. (R. at 68-69). A bench trial was conducted on June 6, 2003, where Mr. Young 
was convicted. (R. at 79-80). Mr. Young was sentenced and committed on July 14, 
2003. (R. at 94-97). 
IV. Statements of Fact: 
On or about May 3, 2002, at approximately 1600, Officers Ron Bruno and 
Jay Bieber of the Salt Lake City Police Department, encountered Mr. Young while 
looking for another individual, Albert Phillips, who was the subject of a police 
investigation. (T. at 6, 32, 46, 49, 55). They were conducting "knock and talks" while 
traveling door to door. (T. at 6). 
The information officers relied upon in their investigation was simply an 
address, name, photo and description. (T. at 18). More importantly, the officers did not 
have any information concerning Mr. Young. However, clearly though, Mr. Young was 
not the man they were looking for and Mr. Young was not the subject of Officers 
Bieber's and Bruno's assigned task. (T. at 12-13, 18-19). Mr. Young was not known to 
be a suspect, for any offense. (T. at 19, 23, 26-29). 
The officers went to the address of 1636 South Pioneer Road, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah looking for Mr. Phillips. (T. at 34). Mr. Young's residence was a motorhome 
6 
situated at that location-it was not the only one. (T. at 6). In deciding which door to 
knock on first, Officer Bruno just picked one. (T. at 10-11). Upon answering Officer 
Bruno's knock on Mr. Young's door, believing Mr. Young to be the subject of the 
investigation, the officers grabbed Mr. Young's arm at the doorway and asked him to 
exit for questioning.2 (T. at 22, 35, 41, 43, 50, 54). While on the porch, Mr. Young 
apprized both officers that he was not Mr. Phillips. Cooperating with questioning, Mr. 
Young gave the officers his name and date of birth. (T. at 13, 36). 
Then without any probable cause, Officer Bieber ran Mr. Young's name 
anyway discovering an outstanding warrant for Mr. Young. (T. at 14-15, 38). The bench 
warrant was issued on April 5, 2002, by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick allegedly for 
failing to follow probation on a prior case no. 972168300. Young was not aware of any 
violation proceeding, however. (R. at 48 f^ 7). 
Because of Mr. Young's outstanding warrant, Officer Bieber arrested Mr. 
Young on the spot and barefoot. (T. at 15, 38-39). Mr. Young works at night so he was 
asleep at the time officers knocked. (T. at 56-57). Having just awoke, Officer Bruno 
volunteered to enter Mr. Young's home and retrieve shoes. He exited with shoes and a 
2
 There exists a huge debate concerning this fact. Officer Bruno only testified that 
he asked Mr. Young to exit and he denies pulling him out-but he was never asked if he 
grabbed his arm. (T. at 22, 35). Officer Bieber denies any recollection. (T. at 41,43). Only 
the defendant was certain that he was (1) grabbed and (2) pulled from his motorhome, nearly 
stumbling. (T. at 50, 54). 
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jacket for Mr. Young.3 (T. at 22-23, 42, 50, 55).4 Officer Bieber then searched Mr. 
Young and nothing was reportedly discovered on his person. (T. at 39, 52). Officer 
Bieber then transported Mr. Young to the Adult Detention Complex for booking. (T. at 
39-40). While en route, Officer Bieber asked Mr. Young repeatedly if he had any 
controlled substances on his person. Mr. Young denied possessing any controlled 
substances. (R. at 49 1f 10, 59 % 2). 
However, while being booked, Deputy Englund searched Mr. Young for a 
second time, and much to both of their surprise, the deputy claimed to discover a 
cigarette pack on Mr. Young's person. (R. at 49 ^ 11, 59-60; T. at 39-40, 46-47). The 
pack allegedly contained a small amount of a controlled substance therein, 
methamphetamine. (R. at 49 f^ 11, 59-60; T. at 40, 47). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this matter Defendant claims he had his Fourth Amendment rights 
violated when (1) officers grabbed his arm through his doorway at the time of 
questioning leaving him to believe he was not free to leave; (2) when officers 
'< Both officers only testified about retrieving shoes, because the jacket was the 
subject of the motion to suppress, both officers were suspiciously forgetful. 
4
 Why would Mr. Young be wearing a jacket? Or, why would Officer Bruno 
retrieve a jacket for Mr. Young being the afternoon of a May day? Either there was a search 
of the jacket while in the motorhome, or the contents of the jacket were planted. If the 
jacket was even his. (T. at 14). 
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unreasonably detained him so that Officer Bieber could conduct a warrants search; (3) 
when Officer Bruno unlawfully seized a jacket for the purpose of setting Mr. Young up 
for a "smuggling contraband into a jail charge;" and (4) when Officer Bieber conspired 
with Officer Bruno to discover the contraband in the jail. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, 
I. Preface to Motion To Suppress, 
For his hearing, the defense presented the following questions to the court 
for examination in an evidentiary hearing: 
(A). Where did the cigarette pack come from? 
(B). Why wasn't the cigarette pack discovered incident to Mr. Young's 
arrest and Officer Bieber's frisk? 
(C). Was Mr. Young's detention on his property reasonable (without 
probable cause and exigent circumstances)? 
(D). Was the second search by Deputy Englund (a warrantless search) 
supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances in view of Mr. Young's arrest? 
(E). Is the search of the interior of the cigarette pack within Deputy 
Englund's scope to search as an exception to the probable cause and exigent 
circumstance requirement? 
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In preparation for the hearing, the defense requested as part of the 
examination for an inclusion of, inter alia, the following items: 
(A). The warrant of Albert Phillips. 
(B). The warrant of Mr. Young. 
(C). The cigarette pack. 
(D). The jacket. 
Point I. Mr. Young Was Seized By Officers Bruno and Bieber Without A Warrant; 
and 
Point II. Acts Against Him Were Done Without The Existence Of Probable Cause 
Or Exigent Circumstances. 
II. Probable Cause, Generally. 
Probable Cause as defined in Black's Law Dictionary: 
Reasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground 
for belief in certain alleged facts. A set a probabilities grounded in the factual and 
practical considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent 
persons and is more than mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence 
required for conviction. An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable 
inquiry (this is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper), 
which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a 
criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged, or, in a 
civil case, that a cause of action existed. 
Black's Law Dictionary Abridged 6th Ed. If 834 (1991). 
This Court in State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) defined 
Probable Cause as a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
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found" (emphasis added) (Citing Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 
2332 (1983). South further stated, 'Thus in determining the existence of probable cause 
we focus on the suspicious nature of the circumstances involved." The only suspicious 
nature in this matter is the officer's conduct. (R. at 59-60; T. at 22-24; 39-41). Nothing 
of Mr. Young's conduct was admittedly suspicious. (T. at 19, 26). 
III. The Trial Courts Level of Discretion, 
The Appellate Courts continually compare reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause in making their decisions. The level of scrutiny is equally applied for one 
as the other. For instance, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Contrel stated that 
"While the required level of [reasonable] suspicion is lower than the standard required 
for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used 
to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' to support reasonable 
suspicion." State v. Contrel 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis by the Court). 
Comparatively, the Utah Supreme Court granted discretion to a trial court 
equally when applying facts to the probable cause standard as when applying them to the 
reasonable suspicion legal standard. The Court stated, in pertinent part: 
This court has yet to consider which standard appellate courts should apply when 
reviewing determinations of probable cause to continue a search in the absence of 
consent. In State v. Pena. [869] P.2d [932] (Utah 1994), we articulated, at length, 
the standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion determinations. 
l i 
Although the legal standards and consequences of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion are distinct, we believe that the standards for reviewing 
them should be the same. As explained in Pena, we review the underlying 
factual finding of the trial court for clear error. Idatn.4 . We review the legal 
conclusion of "probable cause" for correctness, and in so doing, we afford a 
"measure of discretion" which parallels that in Pena to the trial court's legal 
determination of whether the officers had probable cause to search . . . . 
State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531 (Utah 1994). (emphasis added) 
IV. Applying the Probable Cause Standard and Exigent Circumstances. 
A. Generally. 
Section 77-7-2 of the Utah Code addresses when an arrest (synonymous to seizure) may 
be accomplished absent a warrant. The section states: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without 
warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer, "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; 
or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (2002). 
As previously stated, the probable cause requirement is to rise to a level 
upon appellate review that would not result in a close de novo review. Furthermore, the 
trial court has little discretion on issues of probable cause. Defendant contends that this 
matter is not a close call-the trial court clearly erred. 
In this matter, the circumstances do not amount to the level wherein either 
appellate court would uphold a determination on review that the arresting officers had 
either probable cause or the exigent circumstances to detain the defendant while 
conducting an arbitrary search for warrants, and to unreasonable search and seize a jacket 
from his home on a May afternoon because it allegedly contained contraband. 
B. Probable Cause Requirement To Obtain A Search 
Warrant 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Id 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is very similar, it states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
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describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.5 
The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out the significance of the warrant 
requirement, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when it stated: 
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.' (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 454-455 1971). 
Id. They have further reiterated the value of a neutral magistrate in the process of 
searches and warrants associated therewith as they stated in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 
213,236(1983): 
The judicial warranty has a significant role to play in that it provides the detached 
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against 
improper searches than the hurries judgment of a law enforcement officer 
'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' (citation 
omitted) 
Id. In this case a warrant was not sought by either Officer Bruno or Officer Bieber for 
any conduct they believed-for Mr. Young was not the subject of their investigation. 
Neither was a public offense being committed in the officers' presence-Mr. Young was 
asleep, barefoot and not wearing any jacket at the time of arrest. The accidental 
discovery of an outstanding warrant fails to justify the officers baseless detention of Mr. 
Young while awaiting the result of a warrant search. The officers search and seizure of a 
5
 Even though the protections described are similar, the Utah Appellate Courts have 
determined that Art. I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords greater protection to 
individuals than does the U.S. Constitution. See, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990). 
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jacket allegedly from Mr. Young's home is not justified by his retrieval of shoes for Mr. 
Young. 
The Defendant contends that upon verification that Mr. Young was not the 
man in their photo, Officers should not have detained Mr. Young. Neither the name nor 
the photo matched Mr. Young and there were other residences on the property. Why 
didn't the officers ask, "Have you seen this man?" The further detention of Mr. Young 
on his property in order to run a computer check for warrants was an arbitrary abuse of 
authority. Historically, the right guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment was "a right of 
personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 576, reh den. 404 U.S. 874, 
92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971), and that definition emerges most consistently from 
the varying interpretations by both federal and state courts: "The central purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by the government officials." South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 
364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1010 (1976), (Powell J., concurring). See also 
U.S. v. Dunn. 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982). "The considerations of privacy here 
envisioned are not predicated upon a general constitutional 'right of privacy' but upon a 
right to be free from certain kinds of governmental intrusions." Wattenburg v. U.S., 388 
F.2d 853, 858, n. 6 (9th Cir. 1968). As the court in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 
88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 (1967), the "trespass" doctrine once enunciated in 
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Olmstead v. United Stated. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) is no 
longer be regarded as controlling. What re-emerges, consistent with Katz, is the maxim 
of Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent which foreshadowed the precept that government 
protects people, not places: 
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right 
to be left alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, 
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id,6 
In this matter, from a review of the facts presented at the hearing, the 
officers conduct against Mr. Young was suspicious in nature. The logical inferences is 
that the officers set Mr. Young up for Deputy Englund's discovery of contraband upon 
him. First of all, the facts surrounding the encounter were not focused on Mr. Young, 
they were looking to talk with an Albert Phillips. Mr. Phillips wasn't even a suspect. 
Secondly, the results of the two searches of Mr. Young are complete opposites. Why 
would Officer Bieber not discover contraband, but Deputy Englund would? Its peculiar 
that Officer Bieber would question Mr. Young in his police cruiser about contraband on 
his person, and inform Mr. Young that if drugs were discovered on him at the jail, Mr. 
Young would be charged with "smuggling contraband into a jail." (R. at 59-60). 
« Quoted in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983). 
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C. Questionable Facts Omitted Suggest A Concealment Of A 
Violation Of The Fourth Amendment's Probable Cause 
Requirement 
As stated throughout, the defense raised questions of suspicion surrounding 
the Officers' "encounter." Once it was discovered that the officers have contacted an 
innocent man, the officers had no further business with Mr. Young at Mr. Young's home 
and they should have left him alone. Officers Bieber and Bruno were looking for an 
Albert Phillips-they only wanted to talk with Mr. Phillips. Once the officers discovered 
Mr. Young was not their man, the should have immediately left the premises absent 
evidence of wrongdoing by Mr. Young. In this case, the officers violated the chief evil 
Utah law recognizes pertaining to the Fourth Amendment concerning peoples' private 
residence. State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Beavers. 
859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("This elevated burden is a result of the 'heightened 
expectation of privacy' that citizens enjoy in their own homes"); see also United States v. 
United States Dist. Court. 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 
(1972) (stating that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"). The jacket suspicious appears and is 
discovered to have drugs contained in the pocket. Officer Bruno volunteered to enter 
Mr. Young's home to retrieve shoes for Mr. Young. That voluntary offer appears to 
have a suspicious ulterior motive to search apparel. Above the officers forgetfulness, 
Officer Bruno likely retrieved the jacket for the purpose of discovering a crime by an 
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apparent happenstance. The questioning by Officer Bieber in his patrol car suggests 
otherwise. 
D, Conflicting Search Results Suggest A Fourth 
Amendment-Probable Cause Violation. 
As noted herein, two searches of Mr. Young's person were conducted 
incident to his arrest. The first search was conducted at Mr. Young's residence by 
Officer Bieber. The second search was conducted by Deputy Englund at the jail during 
processing. The results of the two searches were complete opposites. Bieber's search 
allegedly failed to discovery anything at all suspicious, including cigarettes. Englund's 
search allegedly yielded contraband in a cigarette pack. If Mr. Young was in possession 
of a pack of cigarettes, why wasn't it confiscated at the scene? Prior to taking Mr. 
Young to the jail, Officer Bieber appeared to demonstrate clairvoyance when he 
encouraged Mr. Young to admit possessing drugs or run the risk of being charges for 
"smuggling contraband into a jail" if a search at the jail discovered he had drugs on his 
person. The defense contends that Officers Bruno and Bieber concealed the truth from 
the judge. 
E. Suppression Of Evidence Is A Necessary. 
On de novo review, the defense recalls for suppression of evidence 
pursuant to the fruit-of the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Both the State of Utah and the 
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United States have embraced the doctrine. In State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, n.5 (Utah 
1995), the Utah Supreme Court footnoted, 'The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as 
enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 
407 (1963), requires the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained through a violation of the 
Fourth or Fifth Amendments.'' In this matter, it is clear from the facts articulated by both 
Officers Bruno and Bieber that (1) the officers' detention at Mr. Young's home prior to 
discovering of an outstanding warrant for him, and (2) the seizure of the jacket and 
contraband were poisonous trees, and any information derived from them were the fruits 
of those poisonous trees. Therefore, suppression in this matter would be appropriate. 
Clearly officers had no reason to run a warrants check, and officers planted the 
contraband upon Mr. Young's person when they retrieved his shoes and the jacket. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Young has been unjustly treated in this matter. Judge Fuchs clearly 
stated that civil rights violations may have occurred. If he believed there was a civil 
rights violation why then would he not conclude exclusion of the evidence to be 
appropriate. The warrants search was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the 
seizure of the jacket was unreasonable. If served the sole purpose of planting contraband 
on his person for the jail to discover, because the discovery of contraband in the home, 
not in plain view, would have been illegally seized. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of 
March, 2004. 
A?, &Q^^_ 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 11th day of March, 2004,1 
served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the 
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Office of the 
Attorney General, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Exhibit "A" 
Final Judgment 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
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Case JVo. O Z ^Oh^oH 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
On the . ^U day of ^T , 20 & s , the above 
named defendant was brought before a judge of the District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
charged with having committed the crime of . c /< 
The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $ . and to serve 
its . days in the County Jail with days in jail to be suspended upon payment of 
e fine on or before 
'he fine has not been paid, nor secured, nor has an appeal been taken; 
You are hereby commanded to take said defendant into custody and safely keep until he/she shall serve 
out the above-named term of imprisonment or shall pay $ , . .... not to exceed one day 
for each """" ""oTthe fine. 
Dated /4 jjutf O 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021906404 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: July 14, 2003 
PRESENT 
CIerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 23, 1964 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 9:04 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/06/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 a< 
Case No: 021906404 
Date: Jul 14, 2003 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 3 65 The total time suspended for this 
charge is 0 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
NO CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
SENTENCE FINE 




Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $4225.00 
Total Surcharge: $356.08 
Total Principal Due: $775.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 3 65 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 775.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
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Case No: 021906404 
Date: Jul 14, 2 0 03 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use- of alcoholic beverages. 
Submit to a mental health evaluation. 
Maintain full time employment and/or education. 
COMPLETE CATS WHILE IN JAIL - court will consider an early release 
upon completion. 
Court will grant credit for time served upon a prepared order from 
counsel. 
Dated this tM day of A O 
DENNI ._ . . 
8TAMP/D3ED AT DIRE^U* &(& s 
\sf^ --lOFuT^  • Ay 
Zg?*jrf£2z 
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Exhibit "B" 
Young's Motion To Suppress 
D.Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax:(801)595-0300 
\ y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 021906404 FS 
Judge Randall N. Skanky 
Comes now the defendant, John Edward Young, by and through counsel, D. 
Bruce Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to suppress any and all evidence 
obtained by the State, or its agents and other peace officers, in this matter for a warrant 
violation / unauthorized search and seizure. The search and seizure of the Defendant in his 
person, place and effects clearly exceeded authority due to no exigent circumstances, no 
probable cause (mistaken identity), and for a violation of the fruits of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. 
This motion is filed pursuant to the Exclusionary Rule, for the officers' 
violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The said 
motion is further supported by the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities which 
is annexed hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and the 
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest, and societal interests for protecting 
individuals rights outweigh that of the government. 
The defendant reserves the right to submit briefing on any issues after the court 
conducts an evidentiary hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of 
October, 2002. 
^ L 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: T. Langdon 
Fisher, District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Dated this 29th day of October, 2002. 
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D.Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax:(801)595-0300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. } Case No. 021906404 FS 
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, ) 
) Judge Randall N. Skanky 
Defendant. ) 
Comes now the defendant. John Edward Young, by and through counsel, D. 
Bruce Oliver, and submits this memorandum of points and authorities supporting his motion to 
suppress evidence obtained in the disregard of Mr. Young's Fourth Amendment and State 
Constitutional Rights to a warrant, probable cause, and the need for exigent circumstances. 
Statements of Fact. 
The following facts are based on the statements made within the Information, the 
police reports and supplemental reports prepared by the officers involved which are filed with 
this Court, officer omissions derived from defense interviews, and any logical inferences drawn 
therefrom. These facts are for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory and Mr. Young does 
not concede to these facts or this factual scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or 
implied. 
1. On or about May 3, 2002, at approximately 1600, Officer Bieber of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, encountered Mr. Young while looking for another individual whom had 
an outstanding warrant. 
2. The ONLY information Officer Bieber relied upon was simply an address and a 
name. Apparently he did not possession a physical description of the person or other 
information. More importantly, he did not have any information concerning Mr. Young. 
3. Mr. Young was not the subject of Officer Bieber's assigned task. 
4. Officer Bieber went to the address of 1636 South Pioneer Road, in Salt Lake City. 
Utah looking for that individual (whose name and whereabouts is unbiown or uncertain to the 
defense). 
5. Upon answering Officer Bieber's knock on Mr. Young's door, believing Mr. 
Young to be the subject of Bieber's warrant. Officer Bieber entered Mr. Young's doorway 
pulling him out in order to arrest him. 
6. While on the porch. Mr. Young apprized Officer Bieber that he was not the 
individual Bieber was attempting to arrest. 
7. Without any probable cause, Officer Bieber ran Mr. Young's name anyway 
discovering an outstanding warrant for Mr. Young. The bench warrant was issued on April 5, 
2002, by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick allegedly for failing to follow probation on case no. 
972168300. Young was not aware of any violation proceeding. 
8. Because of Mr. Young's outstanding warrant, Officer Bieber arrested Mr. Young. 
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9. Officer Bieber searched Mr. Young and nothing was reportedly discovered on his 
person. 
10. Officer Bieber then transported Mr. Young to the Adult Detention Complex for 
booking. While en route, Officer Bieber asked Mr Young if he had any controlled substances on 
his person. Mr. Young denied possessing any controlled substances. 
11. While being booked. Deputy Englund searched Mr. Young for a second time, and 
much to both of their surprise, Englund claimed to discover a cigarette pack on Mr. Young's 
person. The pack allegedly contained a small amount of a controlled substance therein. 
12. The defense presents the following questions to the court for examination in an 
evidentiary hearing: 
(A). Where did the cigarette pack come from? 
(B). Why wasn't the cigarette pack discovered incident to Mr. Young's arrest? 
(C). Was Mr. Young's detention on his property reasonable (without probable 
cause)? 
(D). Was the second search (a warrantless search) supported by probable cause 
and exigent circumstances in view of Mr. Young's arrest? 
(E). Is the search of the interior of the cigarette pack within officer's scope to 
search as an exception to the probable cause and exigent circumstance requirement? 
13. The defense requests the examination to include, inter alia, the following items: 
(A). The warrant of the unknown person. 
(B). The warrant of Mr. Young. 
(C). The cigarette pack. 
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(D). The jacket. 
Arguments. 
Point I. Mr. Young Was Seized By Officer Bieber Without A Warrant; and 
Point II. Without The Existence Of Probable Cause Or Exigent Circumstances. 
A. Introduction. 
Probable Cause as defined in Black's Law Dictionary: 
Reasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for belief 
in certain alleged facts. A set a probabilities grounded in the factual and practical 
considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more 
than mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for conviction. An 
apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry (this is, such inquiry as the 
given case renders convenient and proper), which would induce a reasonably intelligent 
and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the 
crime charged, or, in a civil case, that a cause of action existed. 
Black's Law Dictionary Abridged 6th Ed. 1j 834 (1991). 
The Court of Appeals in State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
defined Probable Cause as a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found." (emphasis added) (Citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 
(1983). The South Court further stated, "Thus in determining the existence of probable cause we 
focus on the suspicious nature of the circumstances involved." 
B, The Trial Court's Level of Discretion. 
The Courts continually compare reasonable suspicion and probable cause in 
making their decisions. The level of scrutiny is equally applied for one as the other. For 
instance, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Contrel stated that "While the required level of 
[reasonable] suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same 
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific 
and articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis by the Court). 
Comparatively, the Utah Supreme Court granted discretion to a trial court equally 
when applying facts to the probable cause standard as when applying them to the reasonable 
suspicion legal standard. The Court stated, in pertinent part: 
This court has yet to consider which standard appellate courts should apply when 
reviewing determinations of probable cause to continue a search in the absence of 
consent. In State v. Pena, [869] P.2d [932] (Utah 1994), we articulated, at length, the 
standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion determinations. Although the 
legal standards and consequences of probable cause and reasonable suspicion are 
distinct, we believe that the standards for reviewing them should be the same. As 
explained in Pena, we review the underlying factual finding of the trial court for clear 
error. Id. at n.4. We review the legal conclusion of "probable cause" for correctness, and 
in so doing, we afford a "measure of discretion" which parallels that in Pena to the trial 
court's legal determination of whether the officers had probable cause to search. . . . 
(emphasis added) 
State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531 (Utah 1994). 
C. Applying the Probable Cause Standard and Exigent Circumstances. 
I. Generally. 
Section 77-7-2 of the Utah Code addresses when an arrest (synonymous to seizure) may be 
accomplished absent a warrant. The section states: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer, "presence includes all of the physical senses or any device that enhances 
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the observations 
of any of the physical senses: 
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(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953, as amended). 
As previously stated, the probable cause requirement is to rise to a level upon 
appellate review that would not result in a close de novo review. Furthermore, the trial court has 
little discretion on issues of probable cause. 
In this matter, the circumstances do not amount to the level wherein either 
appellate court wrould uphold a determination on review that the arresting officer had either 
probable cause or the exigent circumstances to seize the defendant and search his person. 
II. Probable Cause Requirement To Obtain A Search Warrant. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is very similar, it states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
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be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.1 
The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out the significance of the warrant requirement, 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when it stated: 
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions'. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 
1971). 
Id. They have further reiterated the value of a neutral magistrate in the process of searches and 
warrants associated therewith as they stated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983): 
The judicial warranty has a significant role to play in that it provides the detached 
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper 
searches than the hurries judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime' (citation omitted). 
Id. In this case a warrant was not sought by Officer Bieber for any conduct he believed. Neither 
was a public offense being committed in the officer's presence. The latter accidental discovery 
of an outstanding warrant fails to justify Officer Biebefs former seizure and detention of Mr. 
Young on his private property. Officer Bieber mistakenly seized Mr. Young, pulling him out of 
his home. The officer's actions facilitated out of a mistaken identiJfy. While executing a warrant. 
the officer endeavored to arrest Mr. Young on scanty facts, leading Officer Bieber to seize the 
wrong man. 
Upon discovery of the error. Officer Bieber should have released Mr. Young. 
IMMEDIATELY! The further detention of Mr. Young on his property in order to run a 
Even though the protections described are similar, the Utah Appellate Courts have 
determined that Art. I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution affords greater protection to individuals 
than does the U.S. Constitution. See, State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
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computer check for warrants was an arbitrary abuse of authority. Historically, the right 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment was "a right of personal security against arbitrary 
intrusions by official power." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. 
Ed. 2d 564, 576, reh. den. 404 U.S. 874, 92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971), and that 
definition emerges most consistently from the varying interpretations by both federal and state 
courts: 'The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government officials." South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1010 (1976), (Powell J., concurring). See also 
U.S. v. Dunn, 61A F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982). wThe considerations of privacy here envisioned are 
not predicated upon a general constitutional 'right of privacy* but upon a right to be free from 
certain kinds of governmental intrusions." Wattenburg v. U.S., 388 F.2d 853, 858, n. 6 (9th Cir. 
1968). As the court in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 
(1967), the "trespass" doctrine once enunciated in Olmsteadv. United Stated. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. 
Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) is no longer be regarded as controlling. What re-emerges, 
consistent with Katz, is the maxim of Justice Brandeis5 Olmstead dissent which foreshadowed 
the precept that government protects people, not places: 
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right to be left 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To 
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Id? 
In this matter, from a review of the facts presented in the police reports, there 
2
 Quoted in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) 
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appears to be some significant facts omitted from the reports that raise a brow of concern. First 
of all, the facts surrounding the initial encounter are more than suspicious and are not supported 
by the police reports. Secondly, the results of the two searches of Mr. Young are complete 
opposites. 
D. Questionable Facts Omitted Suggest A Violation Of The Fourth 
Amendment-Probable Cause Requirement. 
As stated herein, the defense raises questions of concern regarding Officer 
Bieber's "encounter/' Officer Bieber makes no mention as to his business with Mr. Young at 
Mr. Young's home. After inquiry and investigation, the defense has discovered that Officer 
Bieber was attempting to execute an arrest warrant on another person, whose name is unknown 
to the defense at this time. Once Officer Bieber discovered Mr. Young was not his man, he 
should have immediately left the premises absent evidence of wrongdoing by Mr. Young. The 
officer violated the chief evil Utah law recognizes pertaining to the Fourth Amendment 
concerning peoples' private residence. State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("This elevated burden is a result 
of the 'heightened expectation of privacy' that citizens enjoy in their own homes"); see also 
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
752 (1972) (stating that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed"). 
E. Conflicting Search Results Suggest A Fourth Amendment-Probable Cause 
Violation. 
As noted herein, two searches of Mr. Young's person was conduct incident to his 
arrest. The first search was conducted at Mr. Young's residence by Officer Bieber. The second 
search was conducted by Deputy Englund at the jail during processing. The results of the two 
searches were complete opposites. Bieber*s search allegedly failed to discovery anything at all. 
Englund* s search allegedly yielded contraband in a cigarette pack. If Mr. Young was in 
possession of a pack of cigarettes, why wasn't it confiscated at the scene? In the car ride to the 
jail, Officer Bieber appeared to demonstrate clairvoyance when he suggested that Mr. Young 
admit possessing drugs or run the risk of being charges of additional charges if a search at the jail 
discovered he was smuggling drugs into the facility. The defense contends that either Officer 
Bieber is purposefully concealing facts or he is creating those facts for reasons only known to 
him. 
G. Suppression Of Evidence Is A Necessary. 
In this matter, the defense calls for suppression of evidence pursuant to the fruit-
of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Both the State of Utah and the United States have embraced the 
doctrine. In State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182. n.5 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court footnoted, 
"The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 484, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), requires the exclusion at trial of evidence 
obtained through a violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments." In this matter, it is clear from 
the facts articulated in Officer Bieber's report that the officer's detention at Mr. Young's home 
prior to discovering of an outstanding warrant for him was the poisonous tree, and any 
information derived from that detention was the fruit of that poisonous tree. Therefore 
suppression in this matter would be appropriate. 
Conclusion. 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal detention and unjustified warrants check of the 
Defendant without any belief of wrongdoing by defendant while at Defendant's home. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of 
October, 2002. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: T. Langdon Fisher. District Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111. 
Dated this ,_29th day of October. 2002. 
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State's Response to Motion To Suppress 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
Case No. 021906404 FS 
Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
The State of Utah, through its counsel, DAVID E. YOCOM, Salt Lake County 
District Attorney and LANA TAYLOR, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and respectfully requests J 
this Court deny the Defendant's Motion. V ^ 
if ^ FACTS1 nc i 
V^' M 
On May 3, 2002, at 1636 South Pioneer Road, Salt Lake County, Officer Ron ^ 
Bruno (hereinafter "Officer Bruno") of the Salt Lake City Police Department was 
conducting a follow up investigation regarding a car theft in the immediate area. Officer 
Bruno was looking for car theft suspect, Albert Franklin Philips (hereinafter "Albert 
Philips"), a wanted person with outstanding warrants for his arrest. Based upon the car 
f r T ' 
T<3 
B>'~ * ' Deputy Cterk 
theft investigation, it was determined that Albert Philips was living in a motor home 
located in the rear of several car repair businesses. Officer Bruno also received 
information that Albert Philips was residing at that address with another individual that 
was also involved in the car theft. 
Before approaching the motor home, Officer Jay Bieber (hereinafter "Officer 
Bieber") was called to assist in the investigation. Upon Officer Bieber's arrival, both 
Officer Bruno and Bieber knocked on the door of one of two motor homes parked behind 
the car repair businesses. At the first motor home, the defendant answered the door. The 
defendant stepped out of the motor home and spoke with both officers. Officer Bruno 
then asked the defendant for his name and date of birth to verify who he was. The 
defendant complied and provided the requested information. Officer Bieber ran the 
defendant's name and birthdate through with dispatch and discovered that the defendant 
had, among several other warrants statewide, a warrant out of Salt Lake City for his 
arrest. The defendant was then placed under arrest and handcuffed. However, before 
being placed in Officer Bieber's police car, Officer Bieber conducted a Terry frisk of the 
defendant for weapons. 
During the protective search, Officer Bieber explained to the defendant that if he 
possessed any controlled substances on his person he would need to tell him now or 
otherwise he would be charged with smuggling contraband when he entered the jail. 
Defendant stated that he possessed no controlled substances on his person. Nothing was 
discovered during the protective frisk. Defendant was then transported to the Adult 
Detention Center in Salt Lake County where, during an administrative intake search, 
Facts are provided from police reports and telephone interviews with both Officer Ron Bruno and Officer 
Jay Bieber of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
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Deputy J. Englund (hereinafter "Deputy Englund") found a baggy of methamphetamine 
in the bottom of a cigarette container in the defendant's pocket. Defendant was charged 
with one count of possession of a controlled substance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT 
BECAUSE THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND THE 
OFFICERS WAS A LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER. 
The defendant was not seized without a warrant because the encounter between 
the defendant and the officers was a level one encounter. Police officers "may in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes 
of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to 
make an arrest" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 8 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906-
907 (1968). There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the public: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an 'artibulable suspicion' that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must 
be temporary and last no longer that is necessary to effectuate the purpose 
of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
Salt Lake City v. Ray. 2000 UT App 55 f 10, 998 P.2d 274, 277 (citing State v. Deitman, 
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(per curiam)) (citations omitted ). 
A level one encounter "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to 
an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." Ray, 2000 UT App at Tf 11, 998 
P.2d at 277 (citing State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The Utah 
Court Appeals has held that a request for identification alone "as a matter of 
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law,.. .cannot constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter 
into a seizure.'" Ray, 2000 UT App. at If 12, 998 P.2d at 278 (citing Jackson, 805 P.2d at 
768). Furthermore, 
[e]xamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request-might be 
compelled. 
Ray, 2000 UT App at % 11, 998 P.2d at 277 (citing State v. Patefield 927 P.2d 
655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(quoting United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 
544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). 
In this case, encounter between the defendant and Officers Bruno and Bieber was 
a level one encounter. Both officers were merely following up on a car theft 
investigation and information that Albert Philips was the suspect in that case. Officer 
Bruno had also discovered that another individual who resided with Albert was involved 
in the car theft. After the defendant stepped out of the motor home and agreed to speak 
with the officers, Officer Bieber had the right to request the defendant's name and date of 
birth for identification purposes. Furthermore, based upon the information possessed by 
the officers, Officer Bieber also had the right to run a warrants check on the defendant. 
See Ray, 2000 UT App at If 13 n.2, 998 P.2d at 278 ("A w arrant check will not per se 
escalate the encounter into a level two stop."). Under the circumstances of this case, the 
encounter between the defendant and the officers was merely a level one encounter. 
There is no evidence that the officers threatened the defendant in any to exit the motor 
home or that they displayed any physical force upon the defendant to cooperate with in 
their investigation. The defendant was compliant and voluntarily provided his name and 
4 (A 
date of birth to the officers. Therefore, because the actions of Officer Bieber did not arise 
to a warrantless seizure of the defendant, the defendant's motion should be denied. 
II. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN 
THE DEFENDANT AND THE OFFICERS WAS A LEVEL TWO STOP, 
THE OFFICERS HAD REASONABLE SUSPICTION JUSTIFYING THE 
BRIEF DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THEY HAD 
RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INVOLVED 
IN THE CAR THEFT. 
Even if the court finds that the encounter between the defendant and the officer 
was a level two stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief detention 
of the defendant because they had reliable information that the defendant was involved in 
the car theft investigation. It is well settled that a police officer may detain and question 
an individual "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has 
been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 
450 (Utah 1995). 
The courts have recognized that for an officer to make a non-consensual 
investigative stop, the officer must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 21, 8 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 
(1968). Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon the content of 
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. State v. Humphrey, 937 
P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). 
In applying these principles to the facts of this case, the court should find that the 
defendant was not unreasonably detained by Officers Bruno and Bieber. Officer Bruno 
had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief detention of the defendant to make an 
investigative inquiry regarding his involvement in the car theft. During his investigation, 
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Officer Bruno received information that the main suspect in that case, Albert Philips, was 
living in a motor home in the rear of several car repair businesses. In addition, Officer 
Bruno received information that another individual involved in the car theft resided with 
Albert Philips in the motor home. In conducting a follow up investigation, both Officer 
Bruno and Bieber knocked on the motor home door and spoke with the defendant. The 
defendant voluntarily stepped out of the motor home and provided the officers with his 
name and date of birth. Officer Bieber's investigative inquiry regarding the identity of 
the defendant was the quickest and least intrusive means to investigate whether or not he 
was the individual involved in the car theft with Albert Philips. Under the circumstances 
of this case, this brief detainment was no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose 
of the follow up investigation to determine the defendant's involvement in the car theft. 
Therefore, even if the court finds that the encounter between the defendant and the officer 
was a level two stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief detention 
of the defendant because they had reliable information that the defendant was involved in 
the car theft investigation. 
III. THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST WAS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD, AMONG SEVERAL OTHERS 
WARRANTS STATEWIDE, AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT IN SALT 
LAKE CITY FOR HIS ARREST. 
The defendant's arrest was based on probable cause because the defendant had, 
among several other warrants statewide, an outstanding warrant out of Salt Lake City for 
his arrest. A police officer is constitutionally permitted to arrest an individual when there 
is a warrant for his arrest. U.R.Cr.P Rule 6. A warrant provides sufficient probable 
cause to arrest the individual and extend a seizure. 
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[W]hen a warrant for arrest is issued, it is obviously impossible for every 
peace officer who might apprehend the accused to have the warrant in his 
possession. There is no impropriety in his receiving that information by 
any reliable means, including telephone or two-way radio, and thus 
serving the warrant. 
State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120,121 (Utah 1976). 
Under the circumstances of this case, Officer Bieber acted reasonably in arresting 
the defendant for his outstanding warrant in Salt Lake City. When the defendant 
provided him with his name and date of birth, Officer Bieber ran the information with 
dispatch to verify the identity of the defendant. At that time, Officer Bieber was informed 
that the defendant had, among several other warrants statewide, an outstanding warrant 
for his arrest in Salt Lake City. Officer Bieber reasonably relied upon the information 
provided to him in good faith in executing the arrest of the defendant. Therefore, the 
seizure of the defendant was lawful based upon probable cause. 
IV. THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE 
JAIL WAS LAWFUL AND VALID. 
The search incident to arrest of the defendant at the jail was lawful and valid. 
Warrantless searches are not per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One such recognized exception is a 
search incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable cause. United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S.218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); See a]so Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 
U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). "A custodial arrest of a suspect based 
upon probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that 
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." 
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. "An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station 
or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station, that is no more than a 
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continuation of the custody inherent in the arrest status." Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645. 
"The governmental interests underlying a stationhouse search of the arrestee's 
person and possessions may in some circumstances be even greater than those supporting 
a search immediately following arrest." Id. At a jail, "it is entirely 
proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the 
possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed." Id. Furthermore, "examining all 
the items removed from the arrestee's person or possession.. .is an entirely reasonable 
administrative procedure." Id. See also United v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 
1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)("Searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at 
the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of 
detention."); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983)(Inventory search of the defendant's 
belongings at the jail was a lawful search incident to arrest.). 
In this case, the defendant was lawfully arrested on an outstanding warrant for his 
arrest whereupon Officer Bieber then conducted a protective search of the defendant for 
weapons. The defendant was then immediately transported to jail. During the search at 
of the defendant at the jail, Deputy Englund discovered a baggy of methamphetamine 
in the bottom of a cigarette container in the defendant's pocket. At no time during that 
search was Deputy Englund looking for evidence against the defendant. The search of 
the defendant was conducted as part of a routine administrative procedure incident to his 
arrest. There is no showing that, in conducting the search, Deputy Englund "acted in bad 
faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1,10 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (citation omitted). Therefore, the search incident to arrest of the defendant at 
the jail was lawful and valid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was not seized without a 
warrant because the encounter between the defendant and the officers was a level one 
encounter. However, even if the court finds that the encounter between the defendant and 
the officers was a level two stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion justifying the brief 
detention of the defendant because they had information that the defendant was involved 
in the car theft investigation. Furthermore, the defendant's arrest was based upon 
probable cause because the defendant had, among several other warrants statewide, an 
outstanding warrant in Salt Lake City for his arrest. As a result, the search incident to 
arrest at the jail of the defendant was lawful and valid. Therefore, the State respectfully 
requests that this court deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thigpQTday of NOVEMBER, 2002. 




Deputy District Attorney^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress was delivered to D. BRUCE OLIVER, 
Attorney for the defendant, JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, at 180 South 300 West, Suite 
210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 on t h e j ^ l a y of NOVEMBER, 2002. 
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Exhibit "D" 
Decision On Motion To Suppress 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
NOTICE 
Case No: 021906404 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: December 6, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 23, 1964 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 10:21 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
HEARING 
The above entitled case comes before the court for a Motion to 
Suppress. 
State's witnesses sworn and excluded. 
State calls Officer Ron Vruno - examined. Defense cross examines, 
State re-direct. Re-cross. 
State calls Officer Jay Bieber - examined. Defense cross 
examines. State re-directs. 
State calls Deputy England. (foundation) Defense first examines 
Deputy England. State cross examines. Court questions Deputy. 
State Rests. 
Defense calls John Yound (defendant) sworn and examined. State 
cross examines. 
Page 1 t 0> 
Case No: 021906404 
Date: Dec 06, 2002 
Defense Rests. 
Defense and State argue. Court denies Motion to Suppress. Court 
orders state to prepare Findings and Facts. Defense request this be 
set for Trial. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 03/03/2003 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
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Exhibit "E" 
Transcript Of Suppression Hearing 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
P a g e 1 
* * * * * 
DUPLICATE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ORIGINA L 
P l a i n t i f f , HEARING 
v s . Case No. -Q1290G10 1 
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
* * * * * By. 
m 
NOV I i 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Oeouty ClerK 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of December, 
2002, the Hearing in the above-entitled matter was held 
a t t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t , S a l t L a k e C i l r m I S f V 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 2 2 2003 
This Hearing was electronically recorded, 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 •pSQWBiSHBa— dert of the Court 
Multi-Page 
P a g e 2 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
F o r t h e P l a i n t i f f : MS. TAYLOR 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
F o r t h e D e f e n d a n t : D. BRUCE OLIVER 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
180 S . 300 W., S u i t e 210 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , UT 8 4 1 0 1 
J u d g e : RANDALL N. SKANKY 
• * * * 
I N D E X 
PAGE 
Witness: Ron Bruno 
Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor 5 
Cross Examination by Mr. Oliver 17 
Re-Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor 27 
Re-Cross Examination by Mr. Oliver 31 
Witness: Jay Bieber 
Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor 33 
Cross Examination by Mr. Oliver 41 
Re-Direct Examination by Ms. Taylor 43 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
Multi-Page™ 
Page 3 
Witness: Corbin Robert England 
Direct Examination by Mr. Oliver 46 
Cross Examination by Ms. Taylor 47 
Re-Direct Examination by Mr. Oliver 47 
Witness: John Edward Young 
Direct Examination by Mr. Oliver 49 
Cross Examination by Ms. Taylor 52 
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THE COURT: 
O C E E D I N G S 
Page 4 
Okay. We have the matter of State 
of Utah vs. John Young, 021906404, on for a 
Suppress. 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. And 
for being late, I was in the middle of a 
heated sentencing hearing. 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLIVER: 





Which when she got 
said, "Hot dang." 






All right. Let's call 





Okay. If the three 
come forward, we'll have the Clerk swear 
COURT CLERK : Do you affirm the 
shall give in this case to be the truth, 
truth and nothing but the truth, subject 
penalties of perjury' 
SPEAKER: I 
SPEAKER: I 





















THE COURT: All right. Who would be 
p 




THE COURT: All right. Officer Bruno, if 
d stay up there, the other two of you wou 
in 
free to 
the hall. I think you know-the drill, 
talk to each other, but nothing invol" 
testimony in regards to this case, all right? 
By MS. 
Q 








Officer, please state your full name and 






Ron Bruno -- B-R-U-N-O. 
Where are you currently employed? 
Salt Lake City Police Department. 
In what capacity? 
I'm the Detective of the CIT Team, 









And were you employed in that capacity 
of this year? 
on 
I was not. At that time I was a Detective 
Pioneer Investigative Unit. 
And on the day did you conduct an 
1 investigation at 1636 South Pioneer Road? 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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A Y e s , I d i d . 
Q What was the nature of your investigation 
that day? 
A The case that I was investigating was a 
stolen vehicle case. 
Q And what led you to that address? 
A I was looking for a person by the name of 
Albert Phillips. I was at many different locations the 
day prior and all day that day trying to locate this 
person. And as my trail from one place to another was 
leading me, it gave me the direction and the 
description of a trailer parked at this location behind 
the northwest corner of the building. 
Q And what else is located at this address? 
A There's several different automotive shops 
throughout this whole place, different companies. It's 
a very large complex. 
Q And were there any other trailers that were 
in that area as well? 
A Yes, there was two trailers all together --
trailers -- motorhomes. 
Q And were you able to distinguish between the 
one you were looking for and the other one? 
A Actually, I was looking at both. 
Q All right. And why is that? 







Because I was -- the information that I had 
they were tied in together, the same people 
ng out of both of them. 
And when you say trailer, what kind of 





It was -- From my recollection, one was a 
and the other one was, I believe, a mini 
• 
Okay. And what did you do -- or what 
information were you relying on in going there? 
A Just from what different sources told me, 
that Albert Phillips was actually residing there 
temporari 
location 









ly and that the people that were also at that 
were involved in this stealing of vehicles. 
very large ring that I was investigating. 
When you say ring, what are you talking 
Stolen vehicle ring, a group of people. 
a group of people that were identified by the 
of Motor Vehicles as being involved in 
vehicle thefts and fixing the -- doing 
things with vehicles, including what Mr. 
specialty is, was getting them illegally 
re-registered. 
1 Q And how long had you been investigating this 




A I believe three days. This exact case was, 
I believe, three days, but I knew of this ring and was 
involved in different cases with this ring for 
approximately a month and a half I believe. 
Q And when you say three days on this 
particular case, what case are you talking about? 
A It was a case where a vehicle was taken from 
the parking lot of this complex that I went to see. 
There was a vehicle that was parked -- that was being 
stored at this complex. The vehicle was towed off the 
property, made to run. 
The person who I believe -- The suspect, which 
I believe was Mr. Phillips, was able to go to the DMV 
and get the vehicle -- or get papers claiming that he 
lost the title to the vehicle, get the vehicle re-
titled, sell it to somebody else, and when that person 
went down to register it, they were able to register it 
in their name. 
However, the original owner then discovered it 
was stolen, big long circle, found out that it was 
stolen, and that's when the vehicle was reported to us. 
Through my trail, I was able to put this all together. 
Q All right. And when you say your trail, 
what -- what led up to you responding to this address? 




Well, this is the address of occurrence of 




MR. OLIVER: I'm sorry, you said that the 
of the trailers was the location of the theft? 
THE WITNESS: The complex•where the 
-- where the trailers -- where I came across 
Mr. Young? 
original 
MR. OLIVER: Uh huh. 
THE WITNESS: That was the location of the 
theft of the vehicle that I was actually 
investigating. But at that time -- I mean when I first 
got the case, I had no idea that the theft -- that 
there was going to be a tie-in to that complex until I 
started going out to Magna, went into North Salt Lake, 
went into South Salt Lake, West Valley City and started 
just talking to different people. One person would 
say, you know, you could probably find them here, you 
can probably find them here, I know that he hangs here, 





(By MS. TAYLOR) So when you finally 
after your investigation, at this address, 
you do to further your investigation? 
Basically, I was -- I was under the 
[ impression that Mr. Phillips was staying in one of the 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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two -- I call them trailers -- motorhomes, mini 
motorhome, so I just picked one, knocked on the door, 
Mr. Young answered the door, I identified myself --
Well, actually, I identified myself before the door was 
opened. Once he came to the door, I re-identified 
myself, asked him if I could speak -to him, and we spoke 
for a second. I asked him his name, identified him. 
My partner that was with me, my backup partner that was 
with me, just through procedures -- standard 
procedures, ran --
Q Let me -- Let me just stop you there. 
A You bet. 
Q Who was with you? 
A Detective Bieber - - or Officer Bieber. I'm 
sorry 
MR. OLIVER: Officer who? 








MR. OLIVER: Bieber. 
(By MS. TAYLOR) And you had taken there as 
your routine -- what you would do when you go 
check --
I'm sorry, what was the first --
Well, I'll ask you the question. 
Okay. 
You took another Officer why? ! 












All right. And is that part of your normal 
Yes, it is. 
-- procedure? So you went -- you and 
Bieber went to this location and knocked on one 
two trailers? 
Yes. 
And when you knocked on the trailer door, 


















John did. Mr. Young. 
And is that the individual we have pointed 
Yes. 
And would he -- did he open the door? 
Yes. 
And did he speak with you from inside the 
outside the trailer? 
I asked if he would step out and speak to 
And did he? 
Yes, he did. 
And what did you say to him? 
I told him why I was there, that I was 
gating a stolen vehicle case that I had, and I | 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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was also looking for a wanted person. I asked him what 
his name was and his date of birth, as standard 
procedure to identify the person that I'm speaking 
with. 
Also, there was a possibility that he could be 
involved in this ring, so I wanted 'to identify the 
person. So it was kind of a two-fold thing, that I was 
looking for a wanted person as well as continuing my 
investigation. 
Q Let me -- Let me stop you there. 
A Yes. 
Q You stated that you asked him for his name 
and date of birth; correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Did you ask him to produce any form of 
identification at that point? 
A I don't recall if I did or not. 
Q Okay. And did he give you his name and date 
19 | of birth? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And at the time that you were 
speaking with him, at this point you and he are both 
standing outside the trailer; is that right? 
A Correct. 
Q Why did you ask him to step outside? 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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A Just safety precautions. 
Q Can you explain that? 
A If I was going to -- If I was going to enter 
into the location, I don't know what's inside, I don't 
know if there's weapons or inside the door is a really 
confined space. I would rather have the person come 
out into a more open space where both Officers can be 
in the open. I was not sure what I was dealing with. 
Q Okay. And what happened after Mr. Young 
gave you his name and date of birth? 
A I started asking if he knew -- Well, once 
he gave me that, as procedure, Officer Bieber ran 
warrants -- warrants on the person -- as I continued my 
investigation. 
Q And what is -- Okay. And what does it mean 
to run warrants in this case? 
A You -- Using -- Using our radio system, we 
go to a channel called service channel, and we give a 
dispatcher the name of a person and date of birth, and 
they check the statewide warrant system. 
Q And is that done over a radio that you have 
on your person? 
A Yes. 
Q So did -- when Officer Bieber was running 
this check, did he go anywhere? 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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A No . 
Q And how long -- do you recall how long in 
this particular case that took? 
A For the warrants check? 
Q Yes. 
A Minutes generally. I don't think we were --
Q As long as 15 minutes? 
A I don't think that it was even that long 
that we were even discussing the situation with Mr. 
Young, if I recall. 
Q Okay. So Bieber ran a warrants check over 
the radio, and what did you do? 
A I continued to -- I continued with my 
investigation trying to find if Mr. Young knew Mr. 
Phillips, if he knew of his whereabouts, if he saw him 
there earlier, any information I could find to locate 
Mr. Phillips. 
Q Okay. Then what happened? 
A At that point, he was not able to produce 
much information. If I recall, he did know -- I 
believe that he does know Mr. Phillips and he has seen 
Mr. Phillips at the location if I recall correctly, but 
he did not have any information as in where he was or 
when -- where he lives or anything of that nature. 
Officer Bieber then informed me that Mr. Young had 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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Let me stop 
Yes. 
You said he 












er for him. 
was taken into custody 
He was actually placed 
under arrest for outstandin 
And was he 
Not at that 
ry moment. No. 
Okay. Was 
and not free to 
Yes, he was 








I told him 





enter and get 
, he said yes. 
n of the keys, 





- - I mean 
he advised that he was 
leave? 
advised he 
that he was 
And then yo 
How did that 
-- I asked h 
er, he said 
the keys to 
I entered, 









was under arrest and 
under arrest for 
u stated that you 
come about 
-? 
im if he would like 
yes, I aske 
secure the 
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the keys, came right outside the door and closed the 
door. 
Q And when Mr. Young stepped out to speak with 
you, was the trailer door open or closed? 
A It was closed. 
Q Okay. So he stepped out and closed the door 
behind him? 
A Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood the question. 
Q Do you recall? 
A I cannot recall if it was open or closed. 
Q All right. 
A I believe -- I believe it was opened. 
Q All right. But that he gave you permission, 
so you went in, got the keys and locked the door? 
A Yes. And now, jogging my memory, I believe 
I also retrieved shoes for him. I do not believe he 
had shoes on at the time. 
Q Okay. And then what did you do with his 
keys? 
A Gave them -- Put them in his pocket. 
Q .Okay. What happened then? 
A At that point, we still have the trailer --
another motor -- mini motorhome right next to it, so I 
-- Officer Bieber escorted Mr. Young to the front of 
the motorhome, sat him down on the ground for ^ ^ 
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continuing my investigation. 
And was anybody in the second trailer? 
No. 
Okay. 
Well, we had received no answer. 
All right. So then what did you do? 
At that point, I asked Officer Bieber, since 
I was getting off shift, I asked Officer Bieber 
would complete the warrant service of Mr. Young, 
said he ' 
taken to 
Q 
tfould, I cleared the call and Mr. Young 
j ail. 









MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions for 
this witness. 
THE COURT: Okay. Cross examination. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By MR. OLIVER: 
Q 
you have 
1 and a ha 
Well, Detective Bruno, you indicated 
been on this investigation for about a 
If; is that correct? 
that 
month 










Not the specific investigation that I was 
and that specific car, but I was aware of 
this ring for about a month and a half I 
Okay. This Albert Phillips, how long had 
aware of his name? 
For about a month and a half. He was on - -






luded approximately I believe 20 individuals. 
Did he have a history of any sort? 
Yes, he did. He had a history of stolen 
• 
And had he been booked into the Salt Lake 












Yes, he had been. 
Did you have booking photos of him? 
Yes, I did. 
Did you have a driver's license photo of 
No, I did not. 
And so you knew what Albert Phillips looked 
Yes, I did. 
Is that correct? 
Correct. 




At the time that you approached Mr. Young's 





Yes, I did. 
So when Mr. Young opened th< 
that that was not Albert Phillips?' 
A 
Q 







I knew that was not. 
Now, had anybody identified 
your investigation? 
Oh, prior to -- prior to me 
That's correct. 
No. 
And subsequent thereto he's 
B door, you knew 
Mr. Young at all 
meeting Mr. 
not been 
in any way, shape or form in your 







If you can 
No. 
Now, the motorhome, did you check and see 
the motorhome before -- either of the 
before you approached them? 
No. 
Was this -- And I'm trying 
help me to understand the 1 
say complex. Is it all several shops 
to understand --
ayout there, you 
located on one 
1 piece of property, is there a street in the middle, 
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what do you mean when you say complex? 
A No, it's not a street, there are no streets 
inside the complex. If you can imagine a large, fenced 
off parcel of property with fences -- with a building 
situated nearly in the center of it. There's entrances 
on both sides through the fencing that lead to 
different shops or warehouse type places on this 
property, and there's approximately I believe two other 
outbuildings on this property besides the main one. 
Inside the main building it's a bunch of overhead 
doors, and some of those doors belong to one shop, some 
of those doors belong to another shop, some belong to 
another shop, there's a common bathroom area in the 
back area of that main building. The other two 
buildings I believe are separate shops owned by -- or 
rented by other people. 
And this whole complex has numerous vehicles 
that are being worked on, stowed -- I mean stored that 
have been towed there all along the perimeters and the 
inside, there's just numerous vehicles all over. 
Q Okay. Now, when you knocked on the trailer 
-- and I'll call it a trailer -- motorhome or trailer, 
whatever it is, and I'll just refer to it as a trailer 
if you don't mind. 
A That's fine. 




When you knocked on the trailer that Mr. 
Young was in, is that -- have you come at this point to J 







Did I -- I'm sorry? 
Now, you knocked on the trailer that Mr. 



















Now, have you later come to understand that 
Mr. Young's trailer? 
I -- I don't know if that -- if he is the 
the trailer. I know that he was staying 
Okay. He was living there? 
Okay. 
Is that correct? 
I know that he was staying there. 
And when you entered the trailer, did it 
though he was living in the trailer? 
It looked like somebody was living there. 
Pots and pans, kitchen utensils, whatever 
may be, the regular accoutrements for home 
is that correct? 
I would not be able to say. It also could 
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be a place that was used for taking breaks from a shop. 
There were car parts in there, vehicle parts in there j 
and that. 
Q Okay. Now, when Mr. Young opened the door 
for you, had he just awoken; do you know? 
A I believe he did. 
Q And when he opened the door, isn't it true 
that he opened the door and he didn't have a shirt on? 
A I don't recall. 
Q And he didn't have shoes on; did he? 
A I don't believe he had shoes. I do not 
recall if he had a shirt or not. 
Q And isn't it true that when he opened the 
door that you, rather than asking him to step out, that 
you reached up and grabbed him and pulled him out of 
the trailer? 
A That is not true. 
Q And isn't it true that you then at that 
point in time placed him up against a car and frisked 
him? 
A That is not true. 
Q Now -- And when you went back into the 
trailer, isn't it true that you retrieved from Mr. 
Young both shoes and a jacket? 
A I don't recall the jacket. It is possible 
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that I might have retrieved a jacket. I do not recall 
a jacket. 
Q Do you know who else was living in the home? 
A No, I do not. 
Q Have you ever investigated to find out who 
else was living in the home up to this point in time? 
A No, I have not. 
Q But, at any rate, when you encountered Mr. 
Young outside the trailer, he wasn't wearing the 
jacket; was he? 
A I cannot recall. 
Q If he wasn't wearing shoes, would it seem 
reasonable or plausible to you that he was wearing a 
jacket as well? 
A I -- I am sorry, I do not recall what he was 
wearing. You just jogged my memory that I had to 
retrieve shoes. 
Q Now, after you arrested Mr. Young, did you 
search him? 
A I did not. 
Q Did you give him his miranda warning at all? 
A I did not. 
Q At the time that you encountered Mr. Young, 
you were sure that he was not Albert Phillips, the 
person you were looking for? 
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A That is correct. 
Q And did you have a warrant for Albert 
Phillips or did you just want to talk to him? 
A Both. There were warrants -- outstanding 
warrants for Mr. Phillips' arrest. I believe there was 
four or five all together. 
Q Related to your investigation or just --
A No, separate invest -- separate, not related 
to my investigation, but then I also wanted to speak to 
him about my investigation. 
Q Have you since located Mr. Phillips? 
A I have not. I did get a flag on him, but I 
have not located him. 
Q Do you have a case number on this case that 
you were investigating Albert Phillips? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you have that number with you today? 
A Yes. May I retrieve it? 
Q Uh huh. 
A The case number on that would be Salt Lake 
City Case No. 2002-75174. 
Q 2002-75-17 --
A I'm sorry, 2002-75174. 
Q 174? 
A Yes . 
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Q Now, what did you just pull out, is that the 
police report --
A Yes, it is. 
Q -- that you've prepared to this point in 
time on that? 
A Yes, it is. 
MR. OLIVER: May I approach the witness, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: What does it have to do with this 
hearing? 
MR. OLIVER: I don't know. Well, would he 
know -- Well, he's testified that he went there, he's 
testified that this is the report on that. I don't 
know, there may or may not be information about his 
encounter with Mr. Young contained within this report. 
THE COURT: Well, maybe I'm mistaken, I took 
that to be the report on the original car theft. 
THE WITNESS: That is correct. 
MR. OLIVER: That's correct. That's the one 
on Albert Phillips when he went to Mr. Young's 
residence and located Mr. Young. I don't know that 
there 
THE COURT: No, that isn't what I took it to 
mean. Is it -- In that report do you have reference to 
25 I Mr. Young? 
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THE WITNESS: No, I do not. 
THE COURT: That's just the original car. 
MR. OLIVER: I understand. 
THE COURT: There wouldn't be any (inaudible) 
to Mr. Young. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay. Let me ask -- Let me ask 
another question, because --
Q In your report, with regards to Albert 
Phillips, did you document this particular aspect of 
your investigation of Albert Phillips --
A No, I did not. 
Q - - i n your Albert Phillips report? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you document the statements of the 
people who led you to this location? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Do you know who they were that told you 
about this location? 
A I cannot recall exactly. I believe -- I 
believe it was a service station in West Valley on 3500 
South and about 40th West, but I do not recall. 
Q Now, at the time that you encountered Mr. 
Young, did you believe that he had violated the law? 
A No. 
Q Did you have reason to believe that he had 













By MS. TAYLOR: 
Q 
Multi-Page™ 
t even know who he was; 
No further questions. 
Anyth: Lng on re-direct? 
Couple questions. 
DIRECT 
You stated that 








you were aware of other 
in this ring; is that 
Did you have names of all the other people 









MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I'm going 
y of that, but, more than that, I'm 
that if she 
very easily, 
going to go 




to ask the 
going to 






will want to see 
anymore of that. 
that report 
I mean I ' 
as to how she came to Mr. 
if she's going to start 
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talking about names of co-defendants in the other case, 
I'm going to want to see that police report. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean you can see the 
police report, I don't have any objection, but all that 
police report is is the original theft of a vehicle. 
MR. OLIVER: I understand: 
THE COURT: It doesn't have anything to do 
with his investigation. 
MR. OLIVER: And neither do the co-defendants 
of Mr. Phillips either. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the 
objection, because I think you brought out, when he 
went to the trailer, was he looking for other 
individuals, and I think that's where Ms. Taylor is 
going, and whether she -- I'm going to allow the 
question, go on. And you can do with as you need, but 
go on. 
Q (By MS. TAYLOR) Let me rephrase it so we're 
all on the same page. You stated on cross examination 
that you did not have Mr. Young's name come up as part 
of your car theft investigation; correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q But you did have information that Mr. 
Phillips was not the only one involved; correct? 
A That is correct. 








it's inactive pending contact with Mr. 
• 
And has there been an arrest made in the 
ar case that we have discussed? 





By my agency. 
MR. OLIVER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that. 
THE WITNESS: By my agency. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: There is -- There is possibly a 





(By MS. TAYLOR) Okay. So at the time that 
to the trailer on May 3rd, as well as today, 





And, going back to what you had been asked 
direct examination, did you -- the information 
you relied on when you went to this trailer was that 




Has been staying there. 
And that there were other individuals 
at these two trailers that may also be 




A May be involved with stealing of motor 
vehicles. 
Q Okay. 
A Not necessarily my specific case. 
Q Okay. Okay. And the warrants that were out 
for Mr. Phillips, do you recall what those warrants 
were for? 
A I know the majority of them were involving 
some type of auto theft, joyriding. 
Q Did any of them involve --
MR. OLIVER: Objection. He's answered the 
question. 
MS. TAYLOR: I haven't asked the question. 
MR. OLIVER: Well, it's leading. 
THE COURT: Overruled. This is an evidentiary 
hearing. Go ahead. 
Q (By MS. TAYLOR) Did any of them involve any 
crimes 
A 








warrants that were -
themselves? Not 
Okay. Thank you. 
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to going to this residence you 
believed that this was where Mr. Phillips was staying; 
is that correct? 
A I had inf 
staying there. 
Q Did you a 
search for Mr. Phill 
A No, I did 
Q Why? 
A Because I 
ormation that stated that he is 
ttempt to obtain a warrant to 
ips? 
not. 
did not have probable cause, it J 
was a tip more or less, so I did it as just level one 
knock and talk type 
30 other locations p 
of call, which I've done with about 
rior to this one. 
Q And if you had seen Mr. Phillips, of course, 










J THE COURT: 
iy. 
Okay. No further questions. 
Anything? 
Nothing further. 
All right. You may step down. 
witness can't be excused? 
No, Your Honor. 
Mr. Oliver? 
No. 
You're free to go. Thanks for 










: Thank you very much. 
The State next witness 
Okay. Now, we have Off 








All right. We've said 
different ways so far. But I remind you 
(inaudi 
and 
ble) to tell 







the truth here today und 
jury. 




Please state your full name and s 








Jay Bieber -- last name is B-I-E-
Where are 
Salt Lake 
In what c 
you currently employed? 
City Police Department. 
apacity there? 
I'm a Patrol Officer. 
And were 
of this year 





















I was. Yes. 
And did you assist with Officer Bruno's 
gation at 1636 South Pioneer Road? 
I did. 




Officer Bruno asked me to go out there with 
was checking for a possible suspect and further 
information on a vehicle ring of some sort that had 
been -- a crime ring type of thing that had been 




So what did you do in your assistance with 
Bruno? 
I just -- As he went around, he had 




in a trailer at the rear of the address on 
Road. He had gone, had information, was 
g the trailers to see if he could identify the 







And what happened at the first trailer? 
We knocked on it. Actually, I think it was 
a motorhome type style, but, anyway, knocked 
received no response. 
So then what? 
Officer Bruno went over to another trailer 
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and knocked on that door. 
Q Any response there? 
A Yeah. Mr. -- Mr. Young answered. 
Q Okay. And when Mr. Young answered the door, 
what happened? 
A We identified ourselves as Police Officers, 
Officer Bruno inquired further into the information 
about the individual he was looking for, we asked for 
Mr. Young's name, information for identification 
purposes. 
Q And when Officer Bruno was speaking with Mr. 
Young, where were they standing, in or outside of the 
trailer? 
A We were standing outside the trailer and Mr. 
Young was standing inside his trailer. 
Q Okay. Did Mr. Young come outside his 
trailer? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Okay. And why did Mr. Young come outside 
his trailer? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Okay. So at some point Mr. Young is outside 
the trailer and he's having a discussion with Officer 
Bruno; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
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Q And did you -- were you a part of this 
discussion with Mr. Young as well? 
A I wasn't directly involved, I didn't have 
information about the case in which Officer Bruno was 
investigating, and so I was more of just a -- I don't 
know -- security type role. At the' time, after 
receiving Mr. Young's information, I was checking him 
for warrant information. 
Q Okay. 
A And identification as driver's license or ID 
card. 
Q Okay. You stated that he provided his 
information. What information did he provide? 
A His name and date of birth. 
Q Okay. And did either -- did you -- did --
was he asked for his -- any form of identification? 
A I don't recall. I did end up -- He did not 
have -- I did not have a piece of ID that I actually --
when I was checking to confirm his driver's license 
information, I didn't have a physical driver's license 
or piece of identification to cross reference, I just 
had his -- what he had told me as his name and date of 
birth. 
Q Okay. And how did you -- how did you run a 
check on the information he had told you? 
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A Yes . 
Q And what did you do when you got to the 
jail? 
A I walked him into the booking area, placed 
him on the bench seating, went and filled out a booking 
information sheet, and then assisted Officer England in 
escorting him over to the booking area where he was 
searched by Officer -- or, excuse me, Deputy England. 
Q And was he handcuffed this entire time? 
A Yes, he was. 
Q And were you present when Deputy England 
performed the search? 
A I was. 
Q Did you perform the search or assist in it? 
A I did not. No. 
Q All right. And did Deputy England find 
anything while you were watching him search Mr. Young? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q What did he find? 
A He found a small baggy inside a package of 
cigarettes that was on Mr. Young's person. 
Q Where on Mr. Young's person was the 
cigarette pack found? 
A I don't recall. 
Q All right. And what did Deputy England do 
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with the methamphetamine that he found? 
A He let me know that he had found it, he gave 
it to me, at that time I performed -- well, based upon 
my training experience, I identified it as a controlled 
substance and then I field tested it for 
methamphetamine. 
Q Okay. I don't have further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Cross examination, Mr. 
Oliver. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By MR. OLIVER: 
Q Well, at what time did Mr. -- or at what 
point, excuse me, did Mr. Young come out of his 
trailer? 
A Shortly after we had knocked on the door, 
identified ourselves and spoken to him for oh, maybe a 
minute or two. 
Q And isn't it true that he was assisted out 
of the trailer, told to come out? 
A I don't recall. 
Q You don't recall? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Now, i s n ' t i t t r u e t h a t when Mr. Young came 
o u t of t h e t r a i l e r t h a t h e was n o t w e a r i n g e i t h e r a 
c o a t o r s h i r t o r s h o e s ? 
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A I remember him not wearing shoes, because we 
ended up putting those on him. I don't remember any of 
the rest of the clothing. 
Q* Don't you remember that there was a coat 
that was retrieved for him as well? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Now, when Mr. Young was outside the trailer, 
was he free to leave, if he wanted to go back in the 
trailer and close the door, could he have done so? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Just walked away from you and closed the 
door? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did you advise Mr. Young of his 
constitutional rights at any time? 
A Any specific constitutional right or just --
Q Well, miranda? 
A I did not. 
Q Or any other constitutional rights, if you 










.dn' t advi se him of 
you advise him of 
rights? 
\ that I can think 
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trailer, isn't it true that he was placed up against 
the car and that he was initially just frisked at that 
time? 
A Yes, that is correct. 
Q And was anything located on him at that 
time? 
A No, nothing was located. 
MR. OLIVER: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything on re-direct? 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By MS. TAYLOR: 
Q By the time that you had received the 
information back from dispatch about a warrant, had 
Officer Bruno conduct -- or finished with his 
investigation? 
A He was still speaking with him about if he 
had any further information about the suspect he was 
looking for. 
MS. TAYLOR: All right. And -- Okay. That's 
it. Thanks. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. OLIVER: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right. You can step down. 
Any reason this witness can't be excused? 
MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: All right. You're free to go. 
Thank you for testifying. You may call your next 
witness. 
MS. TAYLOR: That would be Deputy England. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: And, Your Honor, with regards --
Well, no. 
MS. TAYLOR: I'm sorry, did I miss something? 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: At least not yet. Is Deputy 
England's search part of this, does --
MR. OLIVER: I -- I personally only have one 
question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: Other than I was just going to 
stipulate that he didn't have to testify, but now I 
better ask -- I've got one question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: As far as I'm concerned, he 
searched and he found whatever he found, and that's 
where we are. I don't think that's an issue for us. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't you bring 
him in. 
MR. OLIVER: But I did have just one question 
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to ask him, so -- If she'll just allow me to ask the 
question, I'll stipulate to basically the other thing. 
MS. TAYLOR: I'm sorry? 
MR. OLIVER: I said if you'll allow me just to 
ask one question, I'll stipulate to what the other i 
Officers have testified to. 
MS. TAYLOR: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: All right. Deputy, why don't you 
come forward. All right. Let me remind you that you 
are under oath to tell the truth here under pains and 
penalties of perjury; right? 
MR. ENGLAND: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why don't you have a seat. We're 
going to do things a little bit out of order, we're 
going let defense ask a question and maybe abbreviate 
these proceedings. Oh, I think you're okay. Do you 
mind? Do you want this Officer out before you ask the 
questions? 
MS. TAYLOR: (Inaudible). 
MR. OLIVER: I'm going to ask him a question 
that he's already answered. We've got -- We're going 
to have a transcript. As long as he's bound by his 
answer, I have no problem with that. 
THE COURT: Well, wait until he leaves and 
then we'll -- Okay. The prior witness has left the 
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courtroom. Go ahead. 
MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By MR. OLIVER: 
Q State your name for the record, please. 
A Corbin Robert England. 
Q And where are you employed? 
A Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
THE COURT: That's two questions. 
MR. OLIVER: I understand. This is 
foundational. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. OLIVER: I just want to go -- If I don't, 
I mean I don't know what to say, so I apologize. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q (By MR. OLIVER) Were you so employed on May 
3rd of this year, 2002? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Okay. I'm just going to give you some --
kind of a leading question here. Deputy, are you 
familiar with the incident that occurred on 2002 at the 
jail? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Okay. Now, you performed a search on that 
occasion on Mr. Young? 










And you located something on his clothing or 
person; is that correct? 
I did. 
What was it and where was it located? 
White substance that appeared to be 










Where did you find the cigarette package? 
I believe it was in his pocket of his shirt. 
Was it in his shirt or was it in his coat 
Not sure. I don't know. 
You don't recall? 
No. 
MR. OLIVER: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
TAYLOR: 
Just a moment. You found the cigarette pack 





r on the top; is that correct? 
Yes, I did. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. No further questions. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
OLIVER: 
The top meaning the top portion of the body | 
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Q So it was 







do you : 
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of the body, the torso portion of 
either a coat or shirt or 
No further questions. | 
All right. For the Court's 
remember whether it was on the 





















have any additional 
MS. TAYLOR: 
: I don't. 
You don't remember? 
: No. 
Okay. Anything else? 
No. 
Any followup on what I asked? 
No. 
You're free to go. Thanks. 
: Thanks. 
You're excused. Does the State 
witnesses? 
I do not, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLIVER: 





call Mr. Young. 
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COURT CLERK: Do you swear your testimony you 
shall give in this case to be the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth subject to pains and 
penalties of perjury? 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Young, if you'd 
take the stand, please. Go ahead. . 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By MR. OLIVER: 
Q Mr. Young, drawing your attention to the 
date of May 3rd, 2002, do you recall that date? 
A Yeah. 
Q First of all, state your name for the 
record, please. 
A John Young. 
Q And do you recall the date of May 3rd, 2002? 
A Yes, sir, I do. 
Q Now, prior to being arrested on that date, 
were you aware that there was a warrant outstanding for 
your arrest? 
A No, I wasn't. 
Q Tell us what happened from the initial --
begin with the initial encounter with the Police 
Officers, tell us what happened. 
A Well, initially I heard someone pounding on 
the doors and going around to the windows, because I 
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was asleep. I woke up kind of in a daze wondering 
what's going on. I go to open the door, as I opened 
the door, the Officer reaches up and grabs my hand and 
pulls me out of the trailer and questions me if I -- my 
name and stuff like that. 
Q Let me stop you right there. How are you 
dressed at that time? 
A I have no shoes on, pants and a shirt, and 
that's it, I just woke up. 
Q Okay. And did you come out of the trailer 
voluntarily? 
A No. 
Q Did the Officer reach up and pull you out of 
the trailer? 
A As I was opening the door, because it's a 
latch lock, I was standing like the main level, and 
there's like two steps before -- before the door, and 
then the door opens and you walk out. I was like 
standing between the two steps to unlatch the door and 
hold it open, and he reached in and grabbed my arm and 
said, could you step outside and talk to us. 
Q Okay. Now, let me -- just so I have a clear 
picture, I think I understand what you're saying. 
We've heard the difference between a motorhome and a 
trailer here. Is this a motorhome or a trailer? 




Q And oftentimes motorhomes may have step down 
inside of their walls; is that correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q So you have a main floor and then you have 
two steps down and then the outside door; is that 
correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q So you were standing inside that two step 
down 
A Yeah. 
Q -- when you unlatched the door and opened 
it? 
A Yeah. 
Q Now, you've heard one Officer testify that 
you were put up against the car and frisked immediately 
and another one testify that you were not. What 
happened? 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, Your Honor. I heard 
no testimony here today that he was ever put up against 
a car. 
MR. OLIVER: Well, Officer Bieber testified 
that that indeed occurred. 
THE COURT: I think Officer Bieber testified 
that he was frisked, but I'll let him describe what he 

























-- what his recollection is of what occurred. 
THE WITNESS: I was then -- Well, see, there's 
a lot of cars around the -- where my trailer is parked. 
As he pointed out, he turned me around, pushed me 
against -- or away -- away from the -- facing towards 
the trailer against -- my back against to a car, and he 
was emptying my pockets and checked, you know, my pants 
pockets and everything. And I guess he ran my name and 
stuff and came back and said I had a warrant. 
MR. OLIVER: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By MS. TAYLOR: 
Q Okay. You stated that one of the Officers 
pushed you up against a car, you were facing the 
Officer; right? 
A Yeah. 
Q And he pushed you up against a car with your 
back to the car? 
A Yeah. 
Q And were you handcuffed at this time? 
A No. 
Q Okay. This was right after you came out of 
the --
A Yeah. 


















-- out of the motorhome? And how far -- The 
Bp of the motorhome, how far off the ground is 
About two feet. 
And is there a step, is there something --
There -- There's a little box that I placed 
you kind of had to -- when you step down you 
ick short step and then to the ground. 
Okay. So there's a step in between the 
step of the motorhome and the ground? 
Yeah. 
Okay. And which -- And then there's - - i n 












1 motorhc >me 
Right. Where the floor level is. 
Uh huh. 
There -- Yeah, one step and then the floor. 
Okay. And --
And it's only a distance of maybe two feet. 
Okay. 
Short steps. 
And does the door of the motorhome open out? 
Yes, it does. 
So you're standing on the step in the 
and you open the door? 
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A Y e a h . 
Q You're not on the bottom level, you're on 
the step up? 
A No, my one foot is on the bottom level --
floor level at the bottom of the door. 
Q Okay. So you opened the door and what do 
you see, two Officers? 
A Yeah, immediately they're right there, you 
know. The hand I had on the door, because you have to 
unlatch it to open it, and he reached up and grabbed my 
hand and can you step outside, kind of pulled me right 
on out the door. 
Q So he pulled you down the next two steps? 
A Yeah, to ground level. 
Q Okay. Did you stumble, did you fall? 
A Yeah, damn near. 
Q Okay. And which Officer was it that pulled 
you out of the trailer? 
A The first Officer, the older gentleman. 
Q Okay. So Officer Bruno testified first? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. And so then they immediately pushed 
you up against a car? 
A Yeah, they --
Q Was it a --
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A -- basically just flipped me around and 
started patting me down and — 
Q And when they're patting you down, are you 
up against the car at this point? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And --
A Facing them. 
Q -- which Officer was it that pushed you up 
against the car? 
A Basically both of them were right there. I 
mean they didn't per se forcefully, you know, at that 
point, they just turned me around and redirected me 
towards the back to the car -- so my back was against 
the car. 
Q Were you a little surprised at that point? 
A Yeah, I was still in a daze, I was barely 
awake. 
Q Did you struggle with the Officers? 
A Not at all. 
Q And the day they came knocking on your door 
was May 3rd; right? 
A Yeah. 
Q It was about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon; 
right? 
A Yeah. 
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Q And you were asleep before you heard them 
knocking? 
A Oh, yeah. They were knocking against --
were knocking for about ten to fifteen minutes. 
Q So you had -- you were asleep and had a hard 
time waking up and got up and answered the door? 
A Yeah, I had just gone to sleep about 45 
minutes earlier. 
Q Do you usually go to sleep at 3:15 in the 
afternoon? 
A Yeah, when I work all night. 
Q And on this particular day had you used 
methamphetamine? 
A Not that --
MR. OLIVER: Objection. Irrelevant, Your 
Honor 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, Your Honor, this --
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. 






Not -- Not to my --
Had you used alcohol on that day? 
No, I don't drink. 
Okay. But to your recollection you don't 
using that day? 













No. I mean no, I wasn't. 
Okay. 
I didn't do anything, because I had been 
all night. 
And that's why you were so tired at 3:15 
you - - you worked - -
All night through the afternoon. 
MS. TAYLOR: -- all throughout the night. 
have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything on re-direct? 
MR. OLIVER: Nothing. 











MR. OLIVER: We'd rest. 
THE COURT: Okay. Defense has rested. 
s, submit it? 
MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I think that what 
here is we have, like I say, classic Biebers' 





le the Officer claims that he's doing a knock 




Officer Bieber's testimony, he did indicate 
specifically if they had put him up against a 
frisked him and he said yes, that they had done 
immediately. That was the question and answer 
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that was given. 
We have a discrepancy in testimony between the 
Officers as far as their recollection, very (inaudible) 
discrepancies. Based upon what we have, I don't 
believe the Officers had the right to remove Mr. Young 
from the home, didn't have the right to retain -- to 
detain him the way that they had, and even though 
Officer Bieber testified that he was free to leave at 
any time, I don't believe that that's the case when you 
have two Officers present who pull you out of the house 
or drag you out of the house and question you. 
Certainly, that is important. But in this particular 
case, it's our intention, our belief that the Officers 
reached in, grabbed Mr. Young out, he came out without 
shoes on. I don't think he did that voluntarily. He 
came out without his coat on. He said he has his shirt 
and his pants on, but came out without his coat on. I 
don't think he did that voluntarily. And the 
circumstances are that we believe that indeed they had 
time to get a warrant if they had probable cause to go 
in after Mr. Phillips, they didn't have sufficient 
probable cause to get a warrant, they didn't have 
sufficient probable cause to be dragging my client out 
of the trailer and detaining him at that time. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Any response? 
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don't think there's 
out of his trailer. 
they knocked on the 
investigation, whic 
do, Mr. Young opene 
Bruno, he asked him 
for safety -- what 
Officer Bieber, he 
stepped out. 
And, accor 
the Defendant was f 
think that this is 
information that ma 
being up against a 
didn't occur until 
arrest. The point 
he can be searched 
Moreover, 
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: Just briefly, Your Honor. I 
any evidence that he was dragged 
The evidence appears to be that 
door in the course of an 
h I think Officers are entitled to 
d the door, and according to Officer 
L will you step out and talk to us 
he said were safety reasons, wherein 
doesn't recall why the Defendant 
ding to Officer Bieber -- Bieber, 
ree to leave at any time. I don't 
a level two seizure, and any 
y have been in the record about 
car, which I certainly don't recall, 
after the Defendant was under 
is that he's arrested on a warrant, 
incident to arrest. 
when he's searched at the jail 
pursuant to an administrative search and they find 
methamphetamine, certainly that's not a violation. I 
think it is a level 
And even i 
one encounter. 
f it rises to the level -- to the 
level of a -- a level two encounter, which would 
[ require reasonable suspicion, they are there ] 
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investigating a car theft ring and they believe that 
the individuals living in that house are involved. 
So they can certainly talk to this person and 
ask do you know what's going on. Certainly, if there's 
a detention, it lasts no longer than to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. 
The purpose of the stop is to find out about 
this other suspect, to find out if this individual is 
involved, and the warrants check doesn't take any 
longer than to conduct the investigation on the stolen 
vehicle. So I think -- I think the -- the finding of 
the methamphetamine certainly was a lawful search. 
MR. OLIVER: Very briefly, Your Honor. I 
think we do have a level two. And we're not arguing 
that there can't be a search incident to arrest. I 
think that Counsel misplaces our position on that. 
Our position is they searched him at the 
scene, they didn't find anything at the scene, why did 
they find it at the jail? That's the question that was 
asked. That wasn't an issue in this motion, and I 
haven't made it an issue in this motion. 
I think that once he's arrested I think that 
search incident to arrest is appropriate, and I don't 
have an issue with that, nor have I taken issue with 
that. However, the method of getting to the point of 




























Mr. Young came out on his own. 
Of course, he's barefooted, without his coat, 
and he just woke up. So, sure, I -- I can understand 
that. I don't believe it either, but I can understand 
it. So in this particular case it does fall within the 
(inaudible) of State vs. Beaver, exactly what we have 
there. 
And in this particular case they don't have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Young has 
violated the law, they don't have reason to --
reasonable belief or reasonable suspicion that there's 
been a violation of law that occurred that would 
warrant their involvement or their action, and they 
turn this rather into a level one contact, they turn it 
into a level two contact, because they have heard from 
somebody that they can't even identify, maybe at a 
service station or a quick stop out at maybe 3500 
South, maybe 4000 West in West Valley, you know, that's 
where I think I heard it, I don't know who told me, but 
that's where it goes. We'd ask the Court to suppress 
i the evidence. 
[ THE COURT: Okay. Actually, it turned out to 
i be more interesting than I thought it would be. Mr. 
! Oliver, I'm going to deny your motion for the following 
j reasons, all right. I think that the Police Officers 
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itimate right to conduct 




a legitimate right to conduct knock and talks 
eople's homes to see if 
eople that are involved 
don't think they need a 
and investigate a tip. 
think that's what they 
and they found Mr. Young 
fugitives are living 
in a crime are living 
search warrant to 
did, they went to 
, they had tips that 




individuals who might have b 
were located there. I think 





civil liberties or as a 
Mr. Young answered the 
some questions. 
Now, of course, there's a 
een involved in the 
they knocked on the 
Mr. Young's 
constitutional 
door, they started 
contention of fact 
whether Officer Bruno put his arm on Mr. Young or 







course of asking him to step outside. Mr. 
not resist that, Mr. Young did not say I 
to step outside, I don' 
only information I have 
t want to talk to 
is basically that Mr. 
Young willingly went outside. 
There is also a contention as to whether the 
frisking of Mr. Young took place or not at that time. 
ni7i>rk\*AY PFPOPTTMH r w r fKOn ^28-1 1RS 
Multi-Page 







-- To be honest 
was frisked at 
civil rights, 
ion that would 
occurred. 
In the norma 
warrants check 
Page 64 
with you, I think that if Mr. 
that time, that may be a violation 
but I'm not sure that that's a 
cause the Court to suppress what 
1 course of investigation and 
, they don't know who this 
dual is, they're concerned about their safety, 
they have information 
this area may be invo 
police 
I think that 
that individuals that live in 
Ived in a car theft ring. 
's a legitimate level one part of 
conduct that they can run the warrants check. 
They found the warrant for Mr. Young, and I think in 




I'm not sure 
the warrant they can obviously 
that some of his civil liberties 
- obviously, once they run the warrants check, it 





(The tape was turned over) --or the --of the 





along, are you 
Oh, I'm sorry, are you done? 
No, but did you want to say 
I'm just curious for my own, as 
going to request the State zo | 
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; the Court finding 
regard to your 
factually that -- that 
. was frisked as soon as he exited the 
COURT: No. I don' t have any idea whether 
., I'm just saying that that could arise, 
so I'm not making a factual find 
even if it di .d occur 
Ling. But I'm saying 
I'm not sure that that's grounds 
for suppression, because in real 




. time. All right. 
his rights, but it' 
finding 
OLIVER: 
the issue that we've 
ity the drugs weren't 
And it may be a 
s not -- I'm not making 
r that was only if it occurred. 
And I just 
made there 
whether or not an illegal frisk 
suppress the 
want to indicate that 
I don't think goes to 
at that time would 
evidence, but it goes to the credibility 
of the testimony that was taken, 
one says no. 
THE COURT: 
1 jury question, okay. 
Understood. 
because one says yes, 
But I think that's a 




























MR. OLIVER: I understand. I understand, I'm 
just telling you that I don't think -- I think I agree 
with the Court on that, and that wasn't our argument, 
our argument -- the reason that was brought out was 
because of credibility. 
THE COURT: And that's what I thought, which 
is why I mentioned it. It becomes an issue and rights 
may have been violated, and there is a credibility 
issue, but that credibility issue becomes one for the 
trier of fact. 
MR. OLIVER: Or even an issue of detention. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. OLIVER: Which -- Which may be an issue 
that goes to the --to the intent of the Officers when 
they contacted him, so for that, but that's where we 
sit on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: It's not the frisk itself, it's 
the indicia of what it represents. 
THE COURT: That's okay, the Court has, you 
know, made its findings, he then was booked, went to 
jail and the drugs were found. And, of course, that's 
a question for the trier of fact also, why they weren't 
found earlier but were found later. But that then 
becomes an issue for the trier of fact and who they 
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decide to believe or not. 
But I don't think there's grounds, at least at 
this point, to rule that the original investigation 
lacked any probable cause, was a violation of Mr. 
Young's rights -- constitutional rights, and, 
therefore, his arrest and everything taken after that 
should have been suppressed. All right. 
MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you want me to set the 
trial? 
MR. OLIVER: Yeah. I think that, Your Honor, 
at this point in time though I'm going to make a motion 
in limine, it's just going to be -- if we need to file 
a written one, we'll be happy to, but I'm going to ask 
at time of trial we'll stipulate that the Officers 
arrested him, and I will not argue that they did not 
have cause to arrest --






they can just say --
That's correct. 
And that he was on probation? 
That's correct. 
Yeah, the Court would grant that, 
I mean I think an Officer can 
1 always testify in regards to rhe information they 




































And I'd have no problem. 
And, Your 
that would change that is 





different issue, and 
Honor, the only I guess 




I'm talking on direct examination. 
Okay. 
If he takes the stand, that's 
we'11 deal 





ask that we unif 
The other 
a 
with that if and when 
for trial. 
thing is that I would 
:ormly refer to this either as 
er or mobile home. I don' 
long as we're consistent 
THE COURT: Hopefully, 
picture or diagram or something 
we'll 
make 
t care which way we 
and not confusing. 
somebody will have 
, but, yeah, we can 

















when it goes to trial. 
22nd at 10:30. 
I've got a jury --
Twenty-ninth, 30th and 31st 
And I - - No, I've got a two 
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in leaving the 7th open? In other words, what I'm 
asking is, and I'm asking this for my own information, 
if your trial -- if you have another trial that goes on 
the 5th, but then the 7th -- 6th or the 7th is free, 
will we then be shifted to that? 
THE COURT: No, we wouldn'-t do that to you. 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
THE COURT: But, most likely, that won't 
occur. I mean the one on the 6th is --
MR. OLIVER: No, that's okay. 
THE COURT: -- it's a big case; isn't it? 
COURT CLERK: Yeah, that -- that's the Dr. 
Johns. 
THE COURT: Oh, yeah, that's a three day 
trial, that's a -- that's a pornography case, and if it 
goes, it will take more than a day, because the jurors 
have to watch videos. 
MR. OLIVER: And so that's -- we're --
THE COURT: So if it goes, you're bumped. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. OLIVER: But if it does-not go --
THE COURT: Now, if it doesn't go, then -- if 
we -- if we can finish Thursday and you want to do 
something else Friday, that's fine with the Court. Or 
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if that doesn't go, nothing else goes, if you want to 
start Thursday and do this trial Thursday and Friday, 
that's fine with the Court. I'm blocking out 
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday on my calendar. Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: And I don't need to worry about 
Wednesday? 
THE COURT: No, you do need to worry --
MR. OLIVER: Okay. Well, you keep saying 
Thursday and Friday, that's why I just asked that 
question. 
THE COURT: No, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. 
MR. OLIVER: All right. I don't have a 
problem with that. 
THE COURT: So if we finish on Thursday, your 
Friday is your own. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay. No, that's fine. You kept 
saying Thursday, and so that's why I said --
THE COURT: All right. Then that's my fault. 
MS. TAYLOR: He actually said Wednesday, 
Thursday, Friday. 
THE COURT: But that's okay, it doesn't make a 
difference. But as long as --
MR. OLIVER: I apologize. 
THE COURT: It's scheduled to start Wednesday 
morning. 
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MR. OLIVER: T h a t ' s - - O k a y . T h a t ' s w h a t I 
w a n t e d t o know t h e n . 
THE COURT: O k a y . 
MR. OLIVER: T h e n w e ' r e f r e e w h e n e v e r i t ' s 
f i n i s h e d ? 
THE COURT: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
MS. TAYLOR: I s t h a t i t ? 
THE COURT: T h a t ' s i t . W e ' r e d o n e . T h a n k s . 
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